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Balking the Blunders in the Balkans:  
The Western Strategy 
Filip Tesaři and Jan Havránekii 
 
Summary 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the West was obliged to deal with several crises in the 
Balkans and pledged to a complete reconstruction of the post-war situation in the region. 
During this demanding process, the Western countries however maximised their traditional 
stereotyped attitudes towards the Balkan countries. Both the European Union and the United 
States have typecast the Balkan states according to the extent of the internal problems of these 
states, and according to their own ability to deal with such issues.  
Despite the good intentions behind the acting of the West, this process resulted in a mixture of 
shambolic strategies that have made the Western presence in the region very complicated. The 
West has been gradually loosing its military and managing respect, given its reluctance to 
pursue the proclaimed objectives. Such disinclination to act has played into the hands of the 
local bosses, who very soon found out how the system can be abused in order to satisfy both 
their electorate and the Western custodians. 
Nowadays, it is clear that such a hesitant attitude of the West towards the Balkans is no longer 
sustainable. A significant change in the Western strategy towards the Balkan countries is 
required, should the integration of the Balkans into the Western structures (i.e. NATO, EU) be 
successful.  
There are currently two possible scenarios for the Western presence in the region: 
- Partial and insignificant changes will be undertaken. This will lead to conservation 
of the current situation in the international protectorates of Bosnia and Kosovo, and to 
a painful integration of the Western Balkans into NATO and the EU. The tension in 
the region will not decrease. The Western military / police presence in the Balkans 
will need to be preserved, if not strengthen. 
- A complete change of the attitude, as suggested in this paper, will have a positive 
impact on the transformation process in the Balkans. A long-term, comprehensive 
strategy is very likely to end with the integration of most of the Balkan countries into 
NATO and the EU. Such changes will also help to resolve the status of Bosnia and 
Kosovo and the situation there. The West will regain its ruined deputation. 
Both the EU and the Balkans will benefit from the active involvement of the West in the 
region. A Western withdrawal from the Balkans would be counterproductive, for it would 
mean a changeover to a costly, passive protection from the instability. With regard to the 
increasing US engagement in the Greater Middle East, the civil / military management in the 
Balkans will recline upon the EU. 
                                                 
i Filip Tesař is the Senior Researcher at the Prague-based Institute of International Relations (IIR), and a Ph.D. 
candidate at the Charles University, Prague. 
ii Jan Havránek is the Vice-Chairman of the Association for International Affairs (AMO), Prague, and the 
Program Coordinator of the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI). 
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1. Main Issues 
The real goals of the Western presence in the Balkans have been insufficiently discussed, and 
the outcomes of the Western acting in the Balkans were very often half-hearted.i Not only 
there is no general agreement between the EU and the US on what should be the aims of the 
Western presence in the region. There is even no clear EU strategy towards the Balkans as a 
whole. This can be clearly seen on the results of the Western military engagement, the 
operations in the field of civil management and the general political performing of the West. 
 
The reasons for the problems in the military sphere reside in unsatisfactory structures of the 
NATO decision-making process a command. NATO deterrence is thus diminished. This 
causes that the potential of the NATO presence and the process of NATO enlargement have 
both been used for stabilization of the Balkans only to a limited extent.  
 
The problems occurring in the civil management reflect the contradiction in the Western 
idealistic policy and its pragmatic goals. Such contradictions, together with the lack of 
flexibility in the Western acting, resulted in fractional solutions, weakening the authority of 
the Western-led missions.  
 
The above-mentioned issues will be discussed in this paper. While assessing the involvement 
of different international actors in the context of the long-standing insecurity in the region, the 
following seems to be the sought-after action: The EU should realize that it cannot 
disengage from the responsibility for the development in the Balkans. It should define a 
comprehensive strategy, which would enable the EU to fully take on the responsibility.  
 
2. Western Perspectives 
Traditionally, the West has been shaping the internal political scene of the Balkan states. 
Coming under external (i.e. Western) influences, the Balkan region was divided into spheres 
of interests of the major powers. After the Second World War, the relation of the Balkan 
countries to NATO and the Soviet Union determined the political division. Greece, despite a 
very strong anti-Americanism among the Greek population, became a member of the 
Alliance. Yugoslavia officially declared neutrality, but both NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
were regarded as enemies. The rest of the Balkan states (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania) were 
members of the Warsaw Pact (yet Albania left the Pact, and Romania broke off its activities). 
After 1989, the West became a major “partner” of the Balkans. Nowadays, after a period of 
violent conflict in former- Yugoslavia, the West classifies the Balkan countries according to 
their political and economical stability: 
- Romania and Bulgaria. Despite the relative poverty in these countries, both are 
perceived as stable. Illegal migration from these countries is not taken as a significant 
menace. 
- Croatia. Compared to the latter, the internal problems of Croatia are “more serious” 
(nationalism, remnants of the former regime, etc.), however they “can be managed.” 
                                                 
i By the term “West”, we understand especially the European Union and / or the major European powers (France, 
Germany, UK), and the United States. In some cases, referring to the West also includes NATO as another key 
player in the Balkans. The term “Balkans” primarily means the Western Balkans, i.e. the states of the former-
Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia), and Albania. Other Balkan countries (Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania) are also 
mentioned in relevant cases. 
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- Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia. Domestic problems are even more critical than 
in the case of Croatia and they require “a lot of assistance.” 
- Albania. The least stable and the poorest country in the region, and in Europe 
(together with Moldova), feared as a major source of illegal migration and organized 
crime. 
- Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. International protectorates, incapable of fulfilling 
standard state functions. International financial assistance and military and 
administrative presence is needed. In the past, Bosnia served as a base for Islamic 
radicals, and Kosovo remains a source of illegal migration and organized crime. 
Both for Europe and the United States, the Balkans represents an unstable component of the 
Western security environment, and threats stemming from the region are threats to 
transatlantic security in general. Despite of that, no general strategy has been so far 
elaborated. Neither the EU, nor the US has agreed on the common strategy with its 
transatlantic counterpart. None of them have even managed their relation towards the local 
elites. The United States was the player who enforced its goals by power, whereas the Europe 
was seeking for more complex solutions. 
 
3. Key Actors 
3.1. Europe / The European Union 
The current position of the EU in the Balkans must be viewed as the positive result of a 
difficult learning process experienced in the 1990s, and the West European attitude to the 
Balkans is nowadays precisely determined by particular interests that were formed during this 
process. On Europe’s Balkan agenda, the following issues are predominate: 
- Massive migration (as a consequence of civil wars, or newly as a result of human and 
civic rights violations); 
- Organized crime (i.e. drug trafficking and distribution, sex trade and, organization of 
illegal migration, evading); 
- Activities of Islamic radicals (e.g. supporting of the Muslims in armed conflicts, 
creation of the bases for further operations of the Islamic radicals in Europe, spying 
against NATO members, etc.) 
The countries that are not regarded as jeopardy to the European Union with regards to the 
issues mentioned above can be found among the candidate countries. 
Enlarging the European Union to the Balkans is often proclaimed as a natural step after the 
accession of ten new members. This perception may, however, turn out as wrong, and cannot 
be taken for granted. So far, the idea of European accession has been strongly present in many 
political proclamations regarding the Balkans. 
This fact, however, proves that idealistic proclamations very often and repeatedly cover 
particular interests. As a result of this, the EU often orientates itself towards its own short-
term interests, but in the end, it finds itself in a tow of proclaimed, idealistic objectives. Yet 
this does not necessarily mean that it is willing to meet the obligations entailed. 
Since 1991, European diplomacy towards the Balkans has been generally unwilling to act, and 
incapable of enforcement as a means of minimizing the possible threat and thus becoming 
dependent on various events (e.g. war, progress towards European integration, relations to the 
US, etc.). Diplomacy was burdened by its traditional methods. 
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After the last EU enlargement, the EU borders on the Balkans. Four new Central European 
members  (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia), together with Germany, Italy 
and Austria have their own national interests in the Balkans. This will contribute to a stronger 
South European Dimension of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
3.2. United States 
In the 1990s, the US intervened thrice in the events of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
always as a subsequence of the European inability to achieve concrete results (1992, 1994-95, 
1998-2000). After 2000, there was a meaningful shift in the US policy towards the Balkans.  
American diplomacy, unlike the European, was more flexible in negotiations, and more 
predisposed towards enforcement. It was focused on achieving immediate goals, and preferred 
a step-by-step strategy. It was also strongly influenced by national lobbies (especially the 
Albanian lobby). 
Compared to Europe, the US has been more perceptive of the potential threat of Islamic 
terrorism in the Balkans.   The Balkan region represents a strategic link between Europe and 
potential or current points of crisis (The Gulf and the Greater Middle East). For this reason 
since 1994/95, the US has acted to prevent the existence of a Balkan haven or transit for 
international terrorists. 
Since the fall of Milosevic’s regime in 2000, the United States has been turning the regional 
leadership responsibilities over to the European Union. The crisis in Macedonia in 2001 led to 
the EU’s first military operation.  
The US remains supportive of the current trends: the integration of the Balkan states into the 
EU, because it offers credible guarantees of the US interests and investment in the region. 
3.3. Local Political Elites 
The Particular interests of the Balkan countries and their elites are very often contrary to those 
of the West. Although Western engagement in the Balkans was generally justified by the 
effort to help, it was clearly determined by precise objectives. 
On the other hand, the Balkan elites profess universal and common European values, in order 
to get the financial, political or military support of the West.  Such support was consecutively 
used in domestic disputes and/or in conflicts with the neighbours and national minorities. The 
elites very often act according to their immediate interests, although there are exceptions that 
can be found in the governments, e.g. among top economists. 
Personal benefit and the struggle for power are frequently motives for participation in local 
politics, and also determine strategy in relation to the West: the more the vision of integration 
recedes, the more assistance the country usually needs. Simultaneously, elites are resistant to 
controls regarding the utilization of the assistance and to the interference into their monopoly 
of power.  
The objectives declared by the West are attractive for the Balkan political elites only under 
certain circumstances: only if this can bring them more secure or long-lasting political 
benefits. Such orientation also guarantees a certain benefit for the West. Appeals for the 
public do not usually take the right effect, as they address the part of public of a pro-reform, 
democratic and antinationalist profile. 
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4. Military Aspects  
4.1. A Diminished Deterrence 
Western military power has lost much of its deterrent abilities dating back to the past Balkan 
missions. The actions of the German contingent in Prizren, Kosovo, during the unrest in 
March this year perilously reminded us of the behaviour of the Dutch battalion in Srebrenica 
in 1995. 
This leads to speculations as to whether the EU, and perhaps the US, has undertaken a greater 
commitment than it is ready to carry. The key question here remains whether we are willing to 
risk the lives of our soldiers or not, because there is no other way between these two options. 
For the meantime, potential enemies are aware of the fact that the readiness and willingness of 
the West to risk the lives of its soldiers is low. Therefore, the factor of deterrence works only 
to a certain extent – no one in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo or elsewhere will fight due to fear 
of NATO intervention, not because of respect for units currently deployed in the field. Being 
unable to fulfil their deterring function, these units are only a substitution for an outlying 
force. Their presence alone cannot prevent low intensity conflicts. 
If we show that we are willing to take risks, it would strengthen our authority, yet would not 
automatically solve existing problems, such as the ethnic disturbances in Kosovo or in 
Macedonia. 
If we desire that the EU and NATO forces regain their former authority, the Balkan strategies 
of NATO and the EU must be built not only upon consensus in governments and parliaments, 
but also on general domestic consensus within those countries dispatching troops for military 
operations there. 
4.2. Decision-Making and Command 
NATO’s command structures have failed several times in the Balkans. In March 1999, the 
intervention in Yugoslavia began with a delay of few days. This allowed Milosevic to get 
Kosovo under immediate control, leading to systematic ethnic cleansing. In July 1999, the 
Command in the American sector in Bosnia underestimated its intelligence and allowed the 
Russian deployment in Kosovo.  
In March 1999, it turned out that the system of command for Kosovo, drawn up by the 
national troops, and not seen from a strategic perspective, is not functional when it comes to 
concurrent strikes in different locations. Selected units were blocked, and the possibility of 
redeployment was strictly limited (some units even refused to submit themselves to the 
military headquarters in Kosovo). 
Lack of communication among the Western countries, poorly defined objectives and 
unresolved relations between national governments and the mission’s headquarters caused the 
relation between NATO and the national governments to begin to resemble the relations 
between the UN and national governments during the war in Bosnia.  
4.3. NATO Enlargement and Regional Security  
Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities were the first step of the West that demonstrated a will 
to integrate the Balkan countries. Presently, there exists the danger of converting the NATO 
enlargement process into the creation of a “cordon sanitaire” around the most critical 
flashpoints of conflicts. 
- Romania, Bulgaria. States more or less stable internally are members of the North 
Atlantic Alliance. 
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- Albania, Croatia, Macedonia. These states are less stable than the latter, however 
still regarded as “reliable” and “credible.” A reward is their membership in the PfP. 
- Serbia and Montenegro. Its membership in PfP is hindered by poor communication 
between these republics. 
- Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo. These international protectorates, the most 
critical regions in the Balkans, have been sources of large-scale emigration are now 
surrounded by the security environment of the West. 
Such security cooperation also brings a positive effect – regional stability. Its drawback is that 
the geo-strategic aspects sometimes prevail against the countries’ ability to fulfil the role 
ascribed to them by the West. 
For the Balkan countries, NATO enlargement has a different meaning, and regional security is 
not perceived as a primary benefit. NATO membership is particularly understood as a    
milestone on a country’s path to EU membership. It is sometimes taken as a precondition of 
EU membership, or as confirmation of the country’s qualification to join. Local elites are very 
likely to use the rhetoric of integration and cooperation to gain more influence through 
electoral mandates and shows of support from the West (EU, NATO). This also puts the EU 
under pressure, since the Union “should” accept the candidacy of a NATO member.  
 
5. Civil Management 
5.1. Pragmatism or Idealism? 
The basis of the EC/EU representatives’ attitudes towards the Balkans (especially its Western 
countries) has been pragmatic, although their behaviour must be assessed as “idealistic.” The 
reason for this lies in the personal convictions of Europe’s representatives and their visions. 
For example, many West European politicians believed that peace holds the same value for all 
warring parties. Yet this certitude originates in the specific experiences of Western Europe 
after WW2. On the contrary, most of the politicians in the countries of former Yugoslavia saw 
the war as a means of gaining and retaining personal power. For a long period of time, the 
conflicts in former-Yugoslavia were considered spontaneous, and political interests were not 
perceived as the main cause of these wars. 
From the very beginning, the EC/EU approach was based on mediation, which was only 
slowly replaced by an active diplomacy. The EU and its representatives, similarly to the US, 
used the three following instruments of diplomacy for achieving their proclaimed goals: 
- Preferring a certain political stream or party. (During the wars, Germany favoured 
Croatia, the USA Bosniaks. After Dayton, the EU and US favoured the Bosnian social 
democrats against the nationalists). This approach leads only to short-term, irregular 
results. It is successful when there is a strong will for change on the internal scene, 
ideally in combination with other impulses (e.g. the death of the Croatian president 
Tudjman). 
- Creation of an artificial internal consensus. (E.g. establishing the Muslim-Croat 
Federation in B&H). There is a threat here of the means becoming a goal, which 
cannot suffice. This approach is more efficient when based on contracts (The quality 
of such agreement is the ascendant criteria. Most illustrating is the example of the 
Ohrid and Dayton accords, the former signed by political parties and the latter by 
representatives of selected nationalities). 
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- The elimination of local political elites from decision-making. Such an approach can 
be misleading and may lead to the creation of new, parallel structures. This would 
mean replacing cooperation with confrontation. Similarly, this approach can bring the 
inhabitants benefits that the local elites are not ready to secure, for it would upset their 
monopoly of power. In this case, the Western actors are becoming direct participants 
in local politics, thus hindering its development. 
5.2. The Lack of Flexibility in Western Political Strategy  
The Western approach to the Balkans is permanently burdened with several defects.  Very 
often, it takes too long before a concrete goal is set. In addition, consensus on these objectives 
is usually delayed in comparison to contemporaneous development. Moreover, these aims 
remain persistent whatever the circumstances. Modifying or abandoning these aims is then the 
result of consistency, and not of adapting to the given conditions. The goals declared either 
change under political pressure or, in worse case scenarios, are not required at all. The 
important (and difficult) decisions are postponed, yet no solutions are found in the meantime. 
Persisting with rooted preconceptions, and thinking in collective categories (frequently 
referring to Albanians, Serbs or Croats in general) also contributes to inflexibility in the 
Western policy towards the Balkans. A costly error is the mechanical transference of the 
experience from one area to another (e.g. from Bosnia to Kosovo, from Central Europe to the 
Balkans, etc.), without fully readjusting to local needs. 
5.3. The Political base for the EU/UN Representatives 
The representatives of the European Union and the United Nations directly active in the 
Balkans (primarily the High Representative in Bosnia and the head of UNMIK) do not have 
enough political support at their disposal. 
If they are in dispute with the local elites, it leads inevitably to creation of a dysfunctional 
relation between a quasi-government (the West) and a quasi-opposition (parallel structures). 
The heads of the missions cannot then fall back on the institution or political entity that 
installed them and could buttress their position. Furthermore, this is strengthened by an overly 
consensual method for their selection: these positions are often occupied by top officials, who 
– though consensually accepted – are not prepared to exercise their authority over poorly 
working structures. A frequent rotation of these heads of missions (very often occurring in 
Kosovo) leads to a massive change of regular staff, and consequently to a discontinuity of 
governance. 
Since both representatives are selected within the European Union, delegating the missions’ 
management straight to the EU would seem to be a suitable solution. Such a change would 
secure a continuity of the missions’ staff and would draw even more of the EU’s attention to 
the Balkans. It would also help to clarify the competences of the international missions and 
the local authorities. And since a functional democracy and market economy creates the basic 
conditions for an EU entry, it would be possible to harmonize the programs of integration 
with the existing mandates of the OHR and UNMIK.  
Specifically, this would mean preparing Bosnia and Herzegovina for entering into Association 
Agreements with the EU. The pledging of Kosovo’s entry into the EU does not appear as 
urgent or necessary; standardizing relations (e.g. with regards to legal travel to EU countries) 
would, however, have a positive impact on further developments of the protectorate. 
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6. Conclusions: A New Strategy Needed 
The West allies have been struggling for peace in the Balkans for more than a decade, dealing 
with problems as they have been coming. Nowadays, it is clear that the European Union is the 
Western power that can take up the responsibility for the political and economical 
development in the Balkans. The security aspects will still have to be shared in a close 
cooperation with NATO. Our general recommendations for the Western presence in the 
Balkans are: 
I. In order to improve and/or not to worsen the above-discussed state of events, the 
Western powers, i.e. the EU and the US, should clarify their remits, powers, and their 
commitments, and set a long-range strategy. 
II. One of the first steps should be the reform of the existing OHR and UNMIK mandates, 
which would kick off the real integration of the Balkans. 
III. The Western strategy, under the EU leadership, should be set according to the following 
five criteria:  
- The goals, and not the means, should be universal. Clear goals should be identified 
at the very beginning, together with a general consensus on these goals between (and 
within) the EU and the US. Attention should be paid to the fact that these goals are 
essential, although the means of implementation may vary. The means should remain 
means, and not become the objectives; otherwise the West will become hostage of its 
own policy. 
- Reassessment of the position. The approach here must be based on a realistic, 
repeated assessments of the West’s own position. Goals must be set or modified 
according to this evaluation, with regard to the willingness to fulfil them. The reasons 
for the Western presence in the Balkans (i.e. integration and development) should 
remain clear.  This involves a reassessment of the West’s interests in the region. 
- Involvement of the local elites. It is necessary to respect the various interests of the 
local elites, without excluding critical analyses of their motives. Communication with 
local representatives addressing particular questions should be enhanced. In the 
context of general Balkan activities, particular problems should be handled together 
with other regions dealing with similar issues. The process should involve a gradual 
delegation of responsibility for the region’s future to the local politicians. Enhancing 
regional co-operation should not remain a “magic formula” purposely used by the 
West as a means of bringing the stability into the region; it should become a 
precondition for integration. Successful EU / NATO candidates should naturally hand 
on their experience to the countries remaining outside these bodies. 
- Consistency. A single-track approach of the EU member states to the Balkans should 
not be tolerated, and the EU should act unanimously if agreement regarding definite 
objectives has been achieved. A maximum of agreement on these issues between the 
EU and the US is very desirable. Consistency in relations to the local partners should 
be absolute, and all relationships should encompass positive promises and possible 
sanctions (these must be immediately accomplishable, otherwise they would lead to an 
even bigger deprivation of the West’s authority). 
- Changing the methods of negotiation. If Western representatives are employed in 
negotiations, they should play the most active role. This requires reaching the 
maximum consensus at the very beginning, together with a simplification of the 
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mechanisms, and the selection of such assignees/representatives who posses certain 
preconditions for such negotiations. The negotiators should be well acquainted with 
the problems of the Balkan agenda, and should be ready to adapt the negotiations to 
changing circumstances. 
